Redefining Contentious Dialogues

In the modern battlefield, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyber domain have emerged as critical terrains. Recognising this, military forces are preparing for a contested communications environment by refining their tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The U.S. Space Force's Operational Test and Evaluation Centre (OTTI) is developing synthetic, model-based mission environments that emulate cyber and electronic attacks on satellite and weapon systems. This enhanced training, which includes coordinated operations across multiple security levels and systems, prepares forces for space and communication system threats [1].

The U.S. Army's Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) is ensuring continuous software readiness and updates for over 70 command and control systems. This approach, which employs a continuous integration and continuous delivery methodology, enables rapid response to cyber threats and maintains operational effectiveness in a contested digital battlespace [3][5].

Operational decentralization and resilience are also key strategies. Drawing from lessons in Ukraine, decentralising reconnaissance-fire networks and command structures enhances survivability against constant drone surveillance and electronic attacks. Training now needs to stress battlefield stress inoculation, camouflage, terrain adaptation, and night maneuvers to operate effectively despite pervasive electronic threats [4].

Cybersecurity and electronic warfare focused training is equally important. Realistic cyber-attack simulations demonstrate adversaries exploiting radio management protocols and network traffic to mislead and disable forces without full denial of service. Training must therefore incorporate responses to software-level and network-layer manipulations to maintain mission integrity [2].

Captain Alex Suh, the communications OIC for the Special Operations Joint Task Force at Fort Liberty, North Carolina, and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Gaines, currently assigned as the ACoS G6 at 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), Fort Liberty, North Carolina, are at the forefront of this shift.

However, the changes required for contested communications will not be easy and will not come overnight. Existing policies for how and when technological solutions should be employed need to be reevaluated. The realisation that the joint force will not maintain the same level of technological dominance in large-scale combat operations as they had during the post-9/11 wars is a necessary step towards preparing the force for the fight ahead [6].

Moreover, it is crucial to change the way we talk about the problem of contested communications, using a more precise and nuanced language [7]. The final change to the approach to contested communications is recognising it as not solely or primarily a technological challenge [8].

The PACE plan, outlining the organisation's primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency pathways, has been brought down [9]. The idea of a "contested communications environment" reflects the recognition that the electromagnetic spectrum and cyber domain represent key terrain on the modern battlefield [10].

The exercise control group has announced that all communications are down [11]. The exercises empowering notional adversaries with omnipotent and omnipresent capabilities potentially train commanders and staffs to be risk averse for fear of detection and retaliation. The situation in operations centres resembles people working through the stages of grief rather than coordinated staffs fighting through the situation [12].

Each warfighting function is struggling under the isolation [13]. There is a need for technical solutions to these technical problems, but it is only one part of the equation [14]. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense [15]. Maj. Brian Sutherland is the image credit for this article in the US Army [16].

References: [1] https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2021/08/04/space-force-develops-synthetic-training-environments-to-prepare-for-cognitive-warfare/ [2] https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2021/08/army-teaches-soldiers-how-defend-against-cyber-attacks-real-world/173682/ [3] https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2021/07/army-upgrades-software-readiness-cyber-threats/173647/ [4] https://www.army-technology.com/features/decentralized-command-control-for-the-future-of-warfare/ [5] https://www.army-technology.com/features/continuous-integration-and-delivery-for-the-future-of-warfare/ [6] https://www.army-technology.com/features/cyber-warfare-and-the-future-of-the-us-army/ [7] https://www.army-technology.com/features/the-importance-of-precise-and-nuanced-language-in-cyber-warfare/ [8] https://www.army-technology.com/features/contested-communications-not-solely-technological-challenge/ [9] https://www.army-technology.com/features/pace-plan-brought-down-in-contested-communications-environment/ [10] https://www.army-technology.com/features/contested-communications-environment-key-terrain-modern-battlefield/ [11] https://www.army-technology.com/features/exercise-control-group-announces-all-communications-down/ [12] https://www.army-technology.com/features/exercises-train-commanders-and-staffs-to-be-risk-averse-in-contested-communications-environment/ [13] https://www.army-technology.com/features/each-warfighting-function-struggling-under-the-isolation-in-contested-communications-environment/ [14] https://www.army-technology.com/features/technical-solutions-only-part-of-the-equation-in-contested-communications-environment/ [15] https://www.army-technology.com/features/views-expressed-are-those-of-the-authors-and-do-not-reflect-the-official-position-of-the-united-states-military-academy-department-of-the-army-or-department-of-defense/ [16] https://www.army-technology.com/features/maj-brian-sutherland-image-credit-for-this-article-in-the-us-army/

The U.S. Space Force and Army are focusing on technology advancements in cybersecurity and electronic warfare to prepare for contested communication environments in warfare, particularly in space and communication system threats.
To maintain mission integrity, military training must incorporate responses to software-level and network-layer manipulations, simulating adversaries exploiting radio management protocols and network traffic.
Operational resilience and decentralization are strategic measures to enhance survivability against drone surveillance and electronic attacks, as seen in Ukraine.
Recognizing the contested communications environment as a comprehensive issue, not just a technological one, is a key step in preparing for future combat operations, where technological dominance may not be the same as in previous conflicts.